Friday, February 03, 2012
Israel Attack on Iran: Same BS Different Day
“Israel to attack Iran” is a hardy if never-blooming perennial. I rerun this post (originally written on the occasion of Israel’s bombing of an alleged nuclear facility in Syria in 2007) every year as a reminder of the rather daunting technical issues involved in flying from Israel to Iran and blowing things up in a truly convincing fashion, even as the same threats are put forward again and again.
Blowing things up in a truly convincing fashion involves a) flying there b) getting refueled in mid-air c) getting rearmed d) going back and do it again and again against Iran’s dispersed and hardened nuclear facilities.
So it won’t be an orgasmic one-off like the Osiraq reactor strike against Iraq, a nice quasi-surgical demonstration of civilized Israeli warfare. It would be a grinding, prolonged assault, presumably with plenty of Iranian casualties, and with the unmistakable, sustained assistance of a local ally to keep the planes in the air.
Iran’s nuclear facilities are beyond the combat range of Israel’s fighter bombers. So Israeli planes would not only need to overfly Iraq or Saudi Arabia and/or Turkey with or without permission; they would have need to get refueled over Iraq or Saudi Arabia as well on the return trip.
It doesn’t look like the US is going to provide refueling facilities, leaving it up to local partners (unlikely/infeasible) or Israel itself.
This year, the presence of a pro-Iranian government in Iraq would make it necessary for Israel to cross Iraqi airspace without permission, and defy the Iraqi government in prolonged fashion by having Israel’s tankers hovering over Iraq for multiple bouts of mid-air refueling.
And I don’t think Turkey’s going to be keen about permitting overflight, since they aren’t even signing on to the proposed bilateral sanctions against Iran.
That leaves the Saudis. Saudi Arabia is in the midst of an aggressive rollback against Iran in particular and Shi’ites in general, and the London Times quoted an anonymous Saudi source as saying Israeli jets attacking Iran would be waved through Saudi airspace.
Doesn’t quite pass the smell test for me, though. I don’t think the Saudi government is happy to harass the Iranians, but I don’t think they have the stomach for taking the Israeli side in a full-blown war.
On the record comments in December from Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s top security honcho, will undoubtedly be dismissed as disinformation by Western observers because he’s calling for a nuclear-free Middle East (a slap at Israel!), but I think his statement more closely reflect Saudi reality:
Replying to a question about the possibility of an attack on Iran to force it to roll back its nuclear program and the impact of such an action, Prince Turki reiterated that the impact will be “calamitous … cataclysmic, not just catastrophic.”
He said that Iranian actions have provoked worldwide opposition but at the same time suggests that Iran's nuclear program is being singled out, while Israel is being given a clean chit. Any unilateral decision to launch a military attack aimed at halting the nuclear program of Iran could have huge consequences, he warned.
As to the technical issues of refueling, the IDF has made a big deal of demonstrating that it does not need US refueling services, as this report indicates:
In the last days of May and first week of June, 2008, Israel staged an impressive and well-reported exercise over Crete with the participation of the Greek air force. More than 100 Israeli F-16 and F-15 fighter jets, as well as Israeli rescue helicopters and mid-air refueling planes flew a massive number of mock strikes. Israeli planes reportedly never landed but were continuously refueled from airborne platforms. Israel demonstrated that a 1400 km distance could be negotiated with Israeli aircraft remaining aloft and effective. Iran’s Natanz nuclear enrichment facility is 1400 km from Israel.
Early in 2011, the Jersusalem Post reported Israel took delivery of a 707 for conversion into a tanker for refueling its F15-I fighter bombers coming back for Iran. How many additional tankers Israel has is “classified”, but an unsourced thread puts the total number of converted 707s to eight.
The JPost article went on to say:
The air force has conducted a major upgrade of its tanker fleet in recent years and now plans to wait for the US Air Force to choose its future tanker before buying additional aircraft.
Reading between the lines, maybe the United States is not particularly keen on delivering tankers and enhancing Israel’s capability to conduct unilateral air operations against Iran.
Accordingto Karl Vick at Time magazine, Israel doesn’t have the tanker capacity or, for that matter the ordnance, to devastate Iran for weeks:
What everyone agrees, however, is that as formidable as the Israeli Air Force is, it simply lacks the capacity to mount the kind of sustained, weeks-long aerial bombardment required to knock down Iran’s nuclear program, with the requisite pauses for damage assessments followed by fresh waves of bombing. Without forward platforms like air craft carriers, Israel’s air armada must rely on mid-air refueling to reach targets more than 1,000 miles away, and anyone who reads Israel’s order of battle sees it simply doesn’t have but a half dozen or so. Another drawback noted by analysts is Israel’s inventory of bunker-busting bombs, the sort that penetrate deep into concrete or rock that shield the centrifuge arrays at Natanz and now Fordow, near Qum. Israel has loads of GBU-28s, which might penetrate Natanz. But only the U.S. Air Force has the 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator that could take on Fordow, the mountainside redoubt where critics suspect Iran would enrich uranium to military levels.
So, why do we keep talking about Israel’s threats to attack Iran?
I’ve frequently commented that the main purpose of the attack-Iran threat is to yank America’s chain, and forestall possible rapprochement between the United States and Iran.
The Obama administration knows this, I think, and I find its politically-motivated willingness to continue with the sanctions charade, and the low level but cruel and destabilizing program of assassination, sabotage, and economic warfare against Iran rather shameful.
Wednesday, February 8, 2012
Syrian Bloodshed and the West's Abdication of Journalistic Responsibility
Syrian Bloodshed and the West's Abdication of Journalistic Responsibility
The October 13 BBC headline read: Clashes in Syria leave 19 dead – rights activists.
That gives the impression that the brutal Syrian army killed 19 Syrian demonstrators.
Not quite. The story continues:
The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said 10 people died when government troops attacked the northern town of Banash.
In the southern town of Haara, armed men killed at least nine soldiers.
That’s nine Syrian government soldiers. According to Syrian government reports, 1100 Syrian government forces have been killed since the uprising began.
Anti-government violence by armed groups is one of the inconvenient truths about the Syrian uprising.
Democracy activists don’t want to admit it; sympathetic media outlets don’t want to report it.
Now that the issue is becoming unavoidable, the new tactic is to excuse it as the response of incensed deserters, while deploring the “slide toward civil war.”
Not so.
The issue of “armed gangs” has been there from the beginning.
It took a willful abdication of journalistic responsibility to suppress it—and to continue to misrepresent it in order to evade responsibility for the simple-minded (and single-minded) pro-democracy media cheerleading that characterized most reporting on Syria.
Now that the non-violent anti-government protests are sputtering into futility, center stage is taken by the advocates of violent struggle.
For the West and Sunni states to breathe more life into the anti-Assad movement, violence has to be portrayed as inevitable, principled response, not escalating provocation seeking to obscure the failure of a political movement.
I expect the media to cover the issue of anti-government violence with same dishonest, guilty evasiveness it has displayed in the past.
Here’s a piece I wrote in April 2011 about one of the first incidents—an attack on a government convoy near Banyas that killed almost a dozen soldiers, confirmed by a source that I consider impeccable: the family of Josh Landis, the Syria watcher at University of Oklahoma.
It also describes the state of play around a key anti-Assad figure: Abdul Halim Khaddam.
Tuesday, April 12, 2011
Does Abdul Halim Khaddam Have Anything to Do with What's Going on in Syria?
Is Saudi Arabia Showing George W. Bush How to Run the Regime-Change Table in the Middle East?
Saudi Arabia has engaged in some extremely public and forceful pushback against Middle East unrest in general and Iran in particular. In some quarters, it’s being called the Saudi counter-revolution.
Is the pro-Iran/pro-Hezbollah Assad government in Syria the next Shi'a domino?
Iran’s Press TV certainly thinks so.
In an op-ed entitled Saudi Arabia, Jordan Behind Syria Unrest, the authors write:
Saudi Arabia, which often bows to US and Israel's policies in the region, tried to destabilize Bashar al-Assad's government by undermining his rule.
To this end, Saudi Arabia paid 30 million dollars to former vice president Abdul Halim Khaddam to quit Assad's government.
Khaddam sought asylum in France in 2005 with the aid of Saudi Arabia and began to plot against the Syrian government with the exiled leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Khaddam, who is a relative of Saudi King Abdullah and former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri, used his great wealth to form a political group with the aim of toppling Bashar al-Assad.
The triangle of Khaddam-Abdullah-Hariri is well-known in the region as their wives are sisters.
Khaddam's entire family enjoys Saudi citizenship and the value investment by his sons, Jamal and Jihad, in Saudi Arabia is estimated at more than USD 3 billion.
Therefore, with the start of popular protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, the Saudi regime saw an opportunity to drive a wedge between Tehran, Damascus and Beirut axis.
Due to the direct influence of the Saudi Wahhabis on Syria's Muslim Brotherhood, the people of the cities of Daraa and Homs, following Saudi incitement and using popular demands as an excuse began resorting to violence.
It is reported that the United States, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia formed joint operational headquarters in the Saudi Embassy in Belgium to direct the riots in southern Syria. Abdul Halim Khaddam, who held the highest political, executive and information posts in the Syrian government for more than 30 years, is said to have been transferred from Paris to Belgium to direct the unrest.
The reason for this was that based on French law, political asylum seekers cannot work against their countries of origin in France and therefore Khaddam was transferred to Brussels to guide the riots.
Jordan equipped the Muslim Brotherhood in the two cities with logistical facilities and personal weapons.
Although, Bashar al-Assad promised implementation of fundamental changes and reforms after the bloody riot in the country, the Brotherhood followed continued to incite protesters against him.
The Syrian state television recently broadcast footage of armed activity in the border city of Daraa by a guerilla group, which opened fire on the people and government forces. It is said that the group, which is affiliated to Salafi movements, obtained its weapons from Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
Because Syria's ruling party is from the Alevi tribes associated with the Shias, the Brotherhood, due to its anti-Shia ideas, has tried for three decades to topple the Alevi establishment of the country.
Hence, the recent riots in Syria are not just rooted in popular demands and harbor a tribal aspect and Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the US are directing the unrest for their future purposes.
Press TV aside, Abdul Halim Khaddam--who used to be Hafez al-Assad's right hand man/fixer before coming up short in the succession struggle--is insisting he’s just letting human nature and pent-up demands for freedom drive events in Syria without any help from him.
In this recent picture, Khaddam looks quite comfortable in his plush Parisian digs, purportedly purchased through the generosity of his brother-in-law, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and/or acquired as the result of his own billionaire-level business acumen, so maybe he’s just kicking back and letting politics take its course inside Syria.
Of course, in his own words he’s “working around the clock to set an executable plan to achieve [his] targets”, but we’re led to believe that relates to the political struggle after popular unrest has kicked the props out from under the Assad regime.
He’s also willing to foment anti-Iranian and anti-Shi’a sentiment, something that would please his alleged patrons in Riyadh.
In 2006, Khaddam told had this exchange with an interviewer:
Q: What are you current priorities? Do you want to reform the regime, reform it, or topple it?
A: This regime cannot be reformed so there is nothing left but to oust it.
Q: But how will you oust it?
A: The Syrian people will topple the regime. There is a rapidly growing current in the country. Opposition is growing fast. I do not want to oust the regime by military coup. A coup is the most dangerous type of reform. I am working to create the right atmosphere for the Syrian people to topple the regime.
In another interview in 2006—the year he optimistically expected the Assad regime to fall-- Khaddam elaborated on the theme:
Gulf News: On January 14, you announced you would form a government-in-exile that would take over power when the government of President Bashar Al Assad collapsed, but nothing has happened since then. I have contacted opposition forces in London and Washington who welcomed your move but said they have not heard from you. What happened to the government-in-exile idea and are you going to cooperate with the existing opposition forces or form a government of your own supporters?
Abdul Halim Khaddam: I am working with different opposition forces which exist inside Syria and in exile. We are discussing the formation of a government-in-exile. Its main task will be to fill the power vacuum in the country and be in action after the collapse of the regime in Damascus.
I am discussing my proposal directly with the leaders of opposition factions or through mediators. We are looking to foster and strengthen cooperation among different opposition factions, including Muslim Brotherhood, which are banned by law in Syria since 1980. We will announce a programme for a democratic change in Syria that will include all the topics and the issues to be handled by the opposition in the next stage.
We are working round-the-clock to set an executable plan to achieve our targets and to benefit from the blunders committed by the regime in recent years. The regime has handcuffed itself through a chain of fatal mistakes which will help the opposition overthrow the totalitarian regime and launch a democratic era.
Khaddam also beat the anti-Iran and anti-Shi’a drum in 2007—a worrisome combination for Assad, who as a member of a small Shi’a-esque minority sect, the Alawites, reigns over a Sunni majority (an interesting inversion of the situation in Bahrain--Sunni sheiks lording it over disgruntled Shi'a majority):
Khaddam speculated that Assad's regime was being infiltrated by Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps with Iranian intelligence agents having penetrated the Syrian political and security circles. He pointed to an agreement between Syrian and Iranian security organs, a mutual defence agreement signed in 2006 between Tehran and Damascus and a "broad co-ordination between the security organs in the two countries which covers Lebanon and Syria".
Khaddam accused the Iranian ambassador to Damascus of leading the Shi'itisation process in Syria, saying: "Shi'itisation is a political phenomenon carried out by the Iranian ambassador to Damascus with the objective of creating a political situation that is tied to Iran, and this activity is dangerous as it lays the ground for sectarian strife in Syria".
At the very least, Khaddam showed more message discipline that an organization called the Reform Party of Syria. The only conspicuous achievement of the group mentioned on its Wikipedia page was an endorsement of Nicolas Sarkozy for President (of France).
The RPS, although referred to by the World Tribune (itself the perhaps less than authoritative mouthpiece of the politically-wired Soka Gakkai cult in Japan) as "authoritative", appears to have jumped the shark with its recent backgrounder. It stated:
Iran has deployed its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Syria to bolster Syria's defense. The Washington-based opposition group said the IRGC contingent in Syria includes 10,000 troops, with headquarters in the northern province of Homs.
"In essence, the IRGC now occupies Syria and has become its de facto ruler," RPS spokesman Farid Ghadry said. "Syria has become the 32nd province of Iran."
Leaving levity aside, the references to Abdul Halim Khaddam caught my eye because of a sad, sober post by Josh Landis, one of America’s premier Syria-watchers, on his blog, Syria Comment:
The Syrian revolution struck home yesterday. My wife, Manar Qash`ur [Kachour], burst into tears last night as she read the Facebook page that has kept her updated on events in her hometown, Latakia. Lt. Colonel Yasir Qash`ur, who was Manar’s cousin and 40 years old, was shot in Banyas on Sunday. He was one of two Lt. Colonels and 10 military personnel killed – more were wounded. Yasir’s funeral was held in the village this morning – Monday. My brother-in-law, Firas, and father-in-law, Shaaban, both attended.
...
My father-in-law said on the phone this morning that it seemed that supporters of ex-Vice President Khaddam, who was from Banyas, were behind the attack. It is said that they had set a trap for the military unit. All this is speculation, however. We know precious little about who is killing whom in Syria. Allegations are numerous. Real knowledge is scarce.
There is a widespread enthusiasm for acknowledging the popular character of the demonstrations against Assad.
There is intense unease about exploring the role of armed provocateurs in trying to foment more extreme anti-government unrest.
Al Jazeera—which appears an enthusiastic cheerleader for the Syrian protests, even as it seems to show a willingness to hew to the Saudi line in downplaying reporting on the anti-Shi'a crackdown in Bahrain—did run a video segment on Inside Story, Syria: Conspiracies and Condemnation.
Judging from the version on Youtube, it was originally called Conspiracy over Syria Protests; perhaps that title was considered to give excessive credence to the government’s claims.
To an almost ludicrous extent, the moderator, Nick Clark, tried to get his three panelists to comment on video footage aired on Syrian state TV that showed a white Honda riding down a street in some Syrian town with guys firing automatic weapons out the window.
The panelists admitted in passing that it was plausible that gunmen had joined the anti-government protests.
Nobody was willing to discuss the implications, preferring to treat the footage of gunmen—true or not—as simply an attempt by the government to misdirect attention away from the genuine protests. The panelists critiqued the lack of evidentiary meat on the reportorial bones, and used their lack of interest in the clip to emphasize that the Syrian state media—and by implication, the government—had lost credibility.
That white car, with “a chap hanging out firing a machine gun”, as Clark put it...zero traction.
The possibility that the gunmen were pro-government irregulars has subsequently been floated in the media courtesy of pro-demonstrator spokespeople.
A similar vow of omerta seems to apply to the ambush of the Syrian Army patrol that killed Josh Landis's in-law.
One would think the death of nearly a dozen soldiers in an ambush would be considered a remarkable development, considering that the death of equivalent numbers of demonstrators is a world media event.
It’s also rather shocking that, in an acknowledged authoritarian state like Syria, somebody could come up with the wherewithal to mount a successful attack on a rather sizable military patrol.
But even in news for Banyas, the reports of an ambush are virtually a non-story, as the media concentrates on the crackdown instead.
On Josh Landis’ site, a pro-demonstrator commenter advanced the story that one member of the unit had killed the rest of the soldiers in a fit of patriotism, rather than fire on demonstrators.
If reports in Syrian media are truthful, this would have been a remarkable display of determination and marksmanship. In addition to nine dead, twenty three were wounded. Admittedly, Nidal Malik Hasan killed and wounded more at Fort Hood, but those victims were on base and unarmed; the Syrian soldiers were on patrol and presumably within reach of their weapons.
The pro-democracy slaughter line seems less likely than the story of one of the survivors:
Mazin Fittimi reported that he was sitting in the front part of the convey when armed men ambushed and rained them with bullets and grenades from nearby buildings and water sewage canals at 'Al-Qwz Bridage'.
In the Arab press, Khaddam asserted that his home town of Banyas had a long history of repression, persecution, discrimination and marginalization and “don’t need anyone to guide them”.
We’ll see.
Whether or not Khaddam is Saudi Arabia’s Chalabi for Syria doesn’t get a lot of airing in the regional press.
Whether or not he has assets in his home town that would mount an attack on a government convoy is apparently not a matter of widespread interest.
And that doesn’t even go into the matter of Rifaat Assad, Hafez Assad’s brother—and Bashar Assad’s uncle—who tried to take over in a coup and was exiled to France. Rifaat is also married to one of King Abdullah’s sisters.
So that means that the former Number 2 and Number 3 in the Syrian regime are both eager to see Bashar fall on his behind; and both are close to Saudi Arabia, which now appears to be, more than ever, willing to take positive action to sideline its enemies.
Of course, the Assad regime, as the al Jazeera panel pointed out, has been counterproductively coy and vague about the conspirators it claims are dead-set on undermining the government.
Is the Syrian government just blowing smoke? Trying to build a persuasive case before they name names? Afraid to provoke an open breach with the Saudi and Jordanian governments by publicly accusing Khaddam and Rifaat Assad?
Is Syria trying to get the word out indirectly through the willing, eager, but less than respectable outlet of Iran and Press TV instead?
These questions might be worthy of some more media attention.
The October 13 BBC headline read: Clashes in Syria leave 19 dead – rights activists.
That gives the impression that the brutal Syrian army killed 19 Syrian demonstrators.
Not quite. The story continues:
The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said 10 people died when government troops attacked the northern town of Banash.
In the southern town of Haara, armed men killed at least nine soldiers.
That’s nine Syrian government soldiers. According to Syrian government reports, 1100 Syrian government forces have been killed since the uprising began.
Anti-government violence by armed groups is one of the inconvenient truths about the Syrian uprising.
Democracy activists don’t want to admit it; sympathetic media outlets don’t want to report it.
Now that the issue is becoming unavoidable, the new tactic is to excuse it as the response of incensed deserters, while deploring the “slide toward civil war.”
Not so.
The issue of “armed gangs” has been there from the beginning.
It took a willful abdication of journalistic responsibility to suppress it—and to continue to misrepresent it in order to evade responsibility for the simple-minded (and single-minded) pro-democracy media cheerleading that characterized most reporting on Syria.
Now that the non-violent anti-government protests are sputtering into futility, center stage is taken by the advocates of violent struggle.
For the West and Sunni states to breathe more life into the anti-Assad movement, violence has to be portrayed as inevitable, principled response, not escalating provocation seeking to obscure the failure of a political movement.
I expect the media to cover the issue of anti-government violence with same dishonest, guilty evasiveness it has displayed in the past.
Here’s a piece I wrote in April 2011 about one of the first incidents—an attack on a government convoy near Banyas that killed almost a dozen soldiers, confirmed by a source that I consider impeccable: the family of Josh Landis, the Syria watcher at University of Oklahoma.
It also describes the state of play around a key anti-Assad figure: Abdul Halim Khaddam.
Tuesday, April 12, 2011
Does Abdul Halim Khaddam Have Anything to Do with What's Going on in Syria?
Is Saudi Arabia Showing George W. Bush How to Run the Regime-Change Table in the Middle East?
Saudi Arabia has engaged in some extremely public and forceful pushback against Middle East unrest in general and Iran in particular. In some quarters, it’s being called the Saudi counter-revolution.
Is the pro-Iran/pro-Hezbollah Assad government in Syria the next Shi'a domino?
Iran’s Press TV certainly thinks so.
In an op-ed entitled Saudi Arabia, Jordan Behind Syria Unrest, the authors write:
Saudi Arabia, which often bows to US and Israel's policies in the region, tried to destabilize Bashar al-Assad's government by undermining his rule.
To this end, Saudi Arabia paid 30 million dollars to former vice president Abdul Halim Khaddam to quit Assad's government.
Khaddam sought asylum in France in 2005 with the aid of Saudi Arabia and began to plot against the Syrian government with the exiled leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Khaddam, who is a relative of Saudi King Abdullah and former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri, used his great wealth to form a political group with the aim of toppling Bashar al-Assad.
The triangle of Khaddam-Abdullah-Hariri is well-known in the region as their wives are sisters.
Khaddam's entire family enjoys Saudi citizenship and the value investment by his sons, Jamal and Jihad, in Saudi Arabia is estimated at more than USD 3 billion.
Therefore, with the start of popular protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, the Saudi regime saw an opportunity to drive a wedge between Tehran, Damascus and Beirut axis.
Due to the direct influence of the Saudi Wahhabis on Syria's Muslim Brotherhood, the people of the cities of Daraa and Homs, following Saudi incitement and using popular demands as an excuse began resorting to violence.
It is reported that the United States, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia formed joint operational headquarters in the Saudi Embassy in Belgium to direct the riots in southern Syria. Abdul Halim Khaddam, who held the highest political, executive and information posts in the Syrian government for more than 30 years, is said to have been transferred from Paris to Belgium to direct the unrest.
The reason for this was that based on French law, political asylum seekers cannot work against their countries of origin in France and therefore Khaddam was transferred to Brussels to guide the riots.
Jordan equipped the Muslim Brotherhood in the two cities with logistical facilities and personal weapons.
Although, Bashar al-Assad promised implementation of fundamental changes and reforms after the bloody riot in the country, the Brotherhood followed continued to incite protesters against him.
The Syrian state television recently broadcast footage of armed activity in the border city of Daraa by a guerilla group, which opened fire on the people and government forces. It is said that the group, which is affiliated to Salafi movements, obtained its weapons from Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
Because Syria's ruling party is from the Alevi tribes associated with the Shias, the Brotherhood, due to its anti-Shia ideas, has tried for three decades to topple the Alevi establishment of the country.
Hence, the recent riots in Syria are not just rooted in popular demands and harbor a tribal aspect and Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the US are directing the unrest for their future purposes.
Press TV aside, Abdul Halim Khaddam--who used to be Hafez al-Assad's right hand man/fixer before coming up short in the succession struggle--is insisting he’s just letting human nature and pent-up demands for freedom drive events in Syria without any help from him.
In this recent picture, Khaddam looks quite comfortable in his plush Parisian digs, purportedly purchased through the generosity of his brother-in-law, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and/or acquired as the result of his own billionaire-level business acumen, so maybe he’s just kicking back and letting politics take its course inside Syria.
Of course, in his own words he’s “working around the clock to set an executable plan to achieve [his] targets”, but we’re led to believe that relates to the political struggle after popular unrest has kicked the props out from under the Assad regime.
He’s also willing to foment anti-Iranian and anti-Shi’a sentiment, something that would please his alleged patrons in Riyadh.
In 2006, Khaddam told had this exchange with an interviewer:
Q: What are you current priorities? Do you want to reform the regime, reform it, or topple it?
A: This regime cannot be reformed so there is nothing left but to oust it.
Q: But how will you oust it?
A: The Syrian people will topple the regime. There is a rapidly growing current in the country. Opposition is growing fast. I do not want to oust the regime by military coup. A coup is the most dangerous type of reform. I am working to create the right atmosphere for the Syrian people to topple the regime.
In another interview in 2006—the year he optimistically expected the Assad regime to fall-- Khaddam elaborated on the theme:
Gulf News: On January 14, you announced you would form a government-in-exile that would take over power when the government of President Bashar Al Assad collapsed, but nothing has happened since then. I have contacted opposition forces in London and Washington who welcomed your move but said they have not heard from you. What happened to the government-in-exile idea and are you going to cooperate with the existing opposition forces or form a government of your own supporters?
Abdul Halim Khaddam: I am working with different opposition forces which exist inside Syria and in exile. We are discussing the formation of a government-in-exile. Its main task will be to fill the power vacuum in the country and be in action after the collapse of the regime in Damascus.
I am discussing my proposal directly with the leaders of opposition factions or through mediators. We are looking to foster and strengthen cooperation among different opposition factions, including Muslim Brotherhood, which are banned by law in Syria since 1980. We will announce a programme for a democratic change in Syria that will include all the topics and the issues to be handled by the opposition in the next stage.
We are working round-the-clock to set an executable plan to achieve our targets and to benefit from the blunders committed by the regime in recent years. The regime has handcuffed itself through a chain of fatal mistakes which will help the opposition overthrow the totalitarian regime and launch a democratic era.
Khaddam also beat the anti-Iran and anti-Shi’a drum in 2007—a worrisome combination for Assad, who as a member of a small Shi’a-esque minority sect, the Alawites, reigns over a Sunni majority (an interesting inversion of the situation in Bahrain--Sunni sheiks lording it over disgruntled Shi'a majority):
Khaddam speculated that Assad's regime was being infiltrated by Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps with Iranian intelligence agents having penetrated the Syrian political and security circles. He pointed to an agreement between Syrian and Iranian security organs, a mutual defence agreement signed in 2006 between Tehran and Damascus and a "broad co-ordination between the security organs in the two countries which covers Lebanon and Syria".
Khaddam accused the Iranian ambassador to Damascus of leading the Shi'itisation process in Syria, saying: "Shi'itisation is a political phenomenon carried out by the Iranian ambassador to Damascus with the objective of creating a political situation that is tied to Iran, and this activity is dangerous as it lays the ground for sectarian strife in Syria".
At the very least, Khaddam showed more message discipline that an organization called the Reform Party of Syria. The only conspicuous achievement of the group mentioned on its Wikipedia page was an endorsement of Nicolas Sarkozy for President (of France).
The RPS, although referred to by the World Tribune (itself the perhaps less than authoritative mouthpiece of the politically-wired Soka Gakkai cult in Japan) as "authoritative", appears to have jumped the shark with its recent backgrounder. It stated:
Iran has deployed its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Syria to bolster Syria's defense. The Washington-based opposition group said the IRGC contingent in Syria includes 10,000 troops, with headquarters in the northern province of Homs.
"In essence, the IRGC now occupies Syria and has become its de facto ruler," RPS spokesman Farid Ghadry said. "Syria has become the 32nd province of Iran."
Leaving levity aside, the references to Abdul Halim Khaddam caught my eye because of a sad, sober post by Josh Landis, one of America’s premier Syria-watchers, on his blog, Syria Comment:
The Syrian revolution struck home yesterday. My wife, Manar Qash`ur [Kachour], burst into tears last night as she read the Facebook page that has kept her updated on events in her hometown, Latakia. Lt. Colonel Yasir Qash`ur, who was Manar’s cousin and 40 years old, was shot in Banyas on Sunday. He was one of two Lt. Colonels and 10 military personnel killed – more were wounded. Yasir’s funeral was held in the village this morning – Monday. My brother-in-law, Firas, and father-in-law, Shaaban, both attended.
...
My father-in-law said on the phone this morning that it seemed that supporters of ex-Vice President Khaddam, who was from Banyas, were behind the attack. It is said that they had set a trap for the military unit. All this is speculation, however. We know precious little about who is killing whom in Syria. Allegations are numerous. Real knowledge is scarce.
There is a widespread enthusiasm for acknowledging the popular character of the demonstrations against Assad.
There is intense unease about exploring the role of armed provocateurs in trying to foment more extreme anti-government unrest.
Al Jazeera—which appears an enthusiastic cheerleader for the Syrian protests, even as it seems to show a willingness to hew to the Saudi line in downplaying reporting on the anti-Shi'a crackdown in Bahrain—did run a video segment on Inside Story, Syria: Conspiracies and Condemnation.
Judging from the version on Youtube, it was originally called Conspiracy over Syria Protests; perhaps that title was considered to give excessive credence to the government’s claims.
To an almost ludicrous extent, the moderator, Nick Clark, tried to get his three panelists to comment on video footage aired on Syrian state TV that showed a white Honda riding down a street in some Syrian town with guys firing automatic weapons out the window.
The panelists admitted in passing that it was plausible that gunmen had joined the anti-government protests.
Nobody was willing to discuss the implications, preferring to treat the footage of gunmen—true or not—as simply an attempt by the government to misdirect attention away from the genuine protests. The panelists critiqued the lack of evidentiary meat on the reportorial bones, and used their lack of interest in the clip to emphasize that the Syrian state media—and by implication, the government—had lost credibility.
That white car, with “a chap hanging out firing a machine gun”, as Clark put it...zero traction.
The possibility that the gunmen were pro-government irregulars has subsequently been floated in the media courtesy of pro-demonstrator spokespeople.
A similar vow of omerta seems to apply to the ambush of the Syrian Army patrol that killed Josh Landis's in-law.
One would think the death of nearly a dozen soldiers in an ambush would be considered a remarkable development, considering that the death of equivalent numbers of demonstrators is a world media event.
It’s also rather shocking that, in an acknowledged authoritarian state like Syria, somebody could come up with the wherewithal to mount a successful attack on a rather sizable military patrol.
But even in news for Banyas, the reports of an ambush are virtually a non-story, as the media concentrates on the crackdown instead.
On Josh Landis’ site, a pro-demonstrator commenter advanced the story that one member of the unit had killed the rest of the soldiers in a fit of patriotism, rather than fire on demonstrators.
If reports in Syrian media are truthful, this would have been a remarkable display of determination and marksmanship. In addition to nine dead, twenty three were wounded. Admittedly, Nidal Malik Hasan killed and wounded more at Fort Hood, but those victims were on base and unarmed; the Syrian soldiers were on patrol and presumably within reach of their weapons.
The pro-democracy slaughter line seems less likely than the story of one of the survivors:
Mazin Fittimi reported that he was sitting in the front part of the convey when armed men ambushed and rained them with bullets and grenades from nearby buildings and water sewage canals at 'Al-Qwz Bridage'.
In the Arab press, Khaddam asserted that his home town of Banyas had a long history of repression, persecution, discrimination and marginalization and “don’t need anyone to guide them”.
We’ll see.
Whether or not Khaddam is Saudi Arabia’s Chalabi for Syria doesn’t get a lot of airing in the regional press.
Whether or not he has assets in his home town that would mount an attack on a government convoy is apparently not a matter of widespread interest.
And that doesn’t even go into the matter of Rifaat Assad, Hafez Assad’s brother—and Bashar Assad’s uncle—who tried to take over in a coup and was exiled to France. Rifaat is also married to one of King Abdullah’s sisters.
So that means that the former Number 2 and Number 3 in the Syrian regime are both eager to see Bashar fall on his behind; and both are close to Saudi Arabia, which now appears to be, more than ever, willing to take positive action to sideline its enemies.
Of course, the Assad regime, as the al Jazeera panel pointed out, has been counterproductively coy and vague about the conspirators it claims are dead-set on undermining the government.
Is the Syrian government just blowing smoke? Trying to build a persuasive case before they name names? Afraid to provoke an open breach with the Saudi and Jordanian governments by publicly accusing Khaddam and Rifaat Assad?
Is Syria trying to get the word out indirectly through the willing, eager, but less than respectable outlet of Iran and Press TV instead?
These questions might be worthy of some more media attention.
Saudi Arabia, Jordan behind Syria unrest
Saudi Arabia, Jordan behind Syria unrest
The rise in anti-government protests and mounting political tension in Syria brings to mind the question about who is behind these deadly incidents.
A probe into the root causes of the latest events in Syria show that the revolt is mainly supported by Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
The revolt began in the city of Daraa, 120 kilometers south of the capital Damascus and near the border with Jordan.
Daraa is the birthplace of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood, which has close ties to the people in the Syrian city.
Undoubtedly, the Syrians, like other nations in the region, have some legitimate demands which have prompted the government to plan fundamental reforms. However, the protests have come with unjustifiable violence by some suspicious elements.
Similar protests were seen in 1982 against the government of late Syrian president Hafez al-Assad in the cities of Hama and Daraa.
Hafez al-Assad -- the late father of current Syrian President Bashar al-Assad -- was president between 1970 and 2000 and was considered one of the powerful leaders in the Arab world.
Former Jordan King Hussein, former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and the then Saudi King Khalid incited Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood against Syria, when Hafez al-Assad backed Iran during the eight-year Iraqi-imposed war on Iran in the 1980s.
The fighting, which took place from 1982 to 1984, left more than 30,000 people dead, but the late Syrian president finally managed to end the crisis.
Saudi Arabia and Jordan continued their attempts to cause unrest in Syria after the death of Hafez al-Assad and his succession by his son.
Saudi Arabia, which often bows to US and Israel's policies in the region, tried to destabilize Bashar al-Assad's government by undermining his rule.
To this end, Saudi Arabia paid 30 million dollars to former vice president Abdul Halim Khaddam to quit Assad's government.
Khaddam sought asylum in France in 2005 with the aid of Saudi Arabia and began to plot against the Syrian government with the exiled leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Khaddam, who is a relative of Saudi King Abdullah and former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri, used his great wealth to form a political group with the aim of toppling Bashar al-Assad.
The triangle of Khaddam-Abdullah-Hariri is well-known in the region as their wives are sisters.
Khaddam's entire family enjoys Saudi citizenship and the value investment by his sons, Jamal and Jihad, in Saudi Arabia is estimated at more than USD 3 billion.
Therefore, with the start of popular protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, the Saudi regime saw an opportunity to drive a wedge between Tehran, Damascus and Beirut axis.
Due to the direct influence of the Saudi Wahhabis on Syria's Muslim Brotherhood, the people of the cities of Daraa and Homs, following Saudi incitement and using popular demands as an excuse began resorting to violence.
It is reported that the United States, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia formed joint operational headquarters in the Saudi Embassy in Belgium to direct the riots in southern Syria. Abdul Halim Khaddam, who held the highest political, executive and information posts in the Syrian government for more than 30 years, is said to have been transferred from Paris to Belgium to direct the unrest.
The reason for this was that based on French law, political asylum seekers cannot work against their countries of origin in France and therefore Khaddam was transferred to Brussels to guide the riots.
Jordan equipped the Muslim Brotherhood in the two cities with logistical facilities and personal weapons.
Although, Bashar al-Assad promised implementation of fundamental changes and reforms after the bloody riot in the country, the Brotherhood followed continued to incite protesters against him.
The Syrian state television recently broadcast footage of armed activity in the border city of Daraa by a guerilla group, which opened fire on the people and government forces. It is said that the group, which is affiliated to Salafi movements, obtained its weapons from Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
Because Syria's ruling party is from the Alevi tribes associated with the Shias, the Brotherhood, due to its anti-Shia ideas, has tried for three decades to topple the Alevi establishment of the country.
Hence, the recent riots in Syria are not just rooted in popular demands and harbor a tribal aspect and Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the US are directing the unrest for their future purposes.
In the eyes of these three, the removal of Syria's Alevi government would cause the Tehran-Damascus-Beirut axis to collapse and would be followed by the gradual weakening and elimination of Lebanon's resistance.
Therefore suadi and US efforts to topple Assad's government iare taking place with the aim of eliminating the last anti-Zionism resistance front.
This is while, considering the Syrian government's experience in resolving difficult crises, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia and Jordan will succeed in weakening or toppling the Syrian ruling system.
HH/AKM/HN/HGH
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of Press TV.
The rise in anti-government protests and mounting political tension in Syria brings to mind the question about who is behind these deadly incidents.
A probe into the root causes of the latest events in Syria show that the revolt is mainly supported by Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
The revolt began in the city of Daraa, 120 kilometers south of the capital Damascus and near the border with Jordan.
Daraa is the birthplace of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood, which has close ties to the people in the Syrian city.
Undoubtedly, the Syrians, like other nations in the region, have some legitimate demands which have prompted the government to plan fundamental reforms. However, the protests have come with unjustifiable violence by some suspicious elements.
Similar protests were seen in 1982 against the government of late Syrian president Hafez al-Assad in the cities of Hama and Daraa.
Hafez al-Assad -- the late father of current Syrian President Bashar al-Assad -- was president between 1970 and 2000 and was considered one of the powerful leaders in the Arab world.
Former Jordan King Hussein, former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and the then Saudi King Khalid incited Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood against Syria, when Hafez al-Assad backed Iran during the eight-year Iraqi-imposed war on Iran in the 1980s.
The fighting, which took place from 1982 to 1984, left more than 30,000 people dead, but the late Syrian president finally managed to end the crisis.
Saudi Arabia and Jordan continued their attempts to cause unrest in Syria after the death of Hafez al-Assad and his succession by his son.
Saudi Arabia, which often bows to US and Israel's policies in the region, tried to destabilize Bashar al-Assad's government by undermining his rule.
To this end, Saudi Arabia paid 30 million dollars to former vice president Abdul Halim Khaddam to quit Assad's government.
Khaddam sought asylum in France in 2005 with the aid of Saudi Arabia and began to plot against the Syrian government with the exiled leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Khaddam, who is a relative of Saudi King Abdullah and former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri, used his great wealth to form a political group with the aim of toppling Bashar al-Assad.
The triangle of Khaddam-Abdullah-Hariri is well-known in the region as their wives are sisters.
Khaddam's entire family enjoys Saudi citizenship and the value investment by his sons, Jamal and Jihad, in Saudi Arabia is estimated at more than USD 3 billion.
Therefore, with the start of popular protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, the Saudi regime saw an opportunity to drive a wedge between Tehran, Damascus and Beirut axis.
Due to the direct influence of the Saudi Wahhabis on Syria's Muslim Brotherhood, the people of the cities of Daraa and Homs, following Saudi incitement and using popular demands as an excuse began resorting to violence.
It is reported that the United States, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia formed joint operational headquarters in the Saudi Embassy in Belgium to direct the riots in southern Syria. Abdul Halim Khaddam, who held the highest political, executive and information posts in the Syrian government for more than 30 years, is said to have been transferred from Paris to Belgium to direct the unrest.
The reason for this was that based on French law, political asylum seekers cannot work against their countries of origin in France and therefore Khaddam was transferred to Brussels to guide the riots.
Jordan equipped the Muslim Brotherhood in the two cities with logistical facilities and personal weapons.
Although, Bashar al-Assad promised implementation of fundamental changes and reforms after the bloody riot in the country, the Brotherhood followed continued to incite protesters against him.
The Syrian state television recently broadcast footage of armed activity in the border city of Daraa by a guerilla group, which opened fire on the people and government forces. It is said that the group, which is affiliated to Salafi movements, obtained its weapons from Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
Because Syria's ruling party is from the Alevi tribes associated with the Shias, the Brotherhood, due to its anti-Shia ideas, has tried for three decades to topple the Alevi establishment of the country.
Hence, the recent riots in Syria are not just rooted in popular demands and harbor a tribal aspect and Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the US are directing the unrest for their future purposes.
In the eyes of these three, the removal of Syria's Alevi government would cause the Tehran-Damascus-Beirut axis to collapse and would be followed by the gradual weakening and elimination of Lebanon's resistance.
Therefore suadi and US efforts to topple Assad's government iare taking place with the aim of eliminating the last anti-Zionism resistance front.
This is while, considering the Syrian government's experience in resolving difficult crises, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia and Jordan will succeed in weakening or toppling the Syrian ruling system.
HH/AKM/HN/HGH
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of Press TV.
Friday, February 3, 2012
Джамаа аль-Таухид Wal-джихад в Филиппин обратилось к Всемирному моджахедов, чтобы помочь джихаду в Филиппины
Джамаа аль-Таухид Wal-джихад в Филиппин обратилось к Всемирному моджахедов, чтобы помочь джихаду в Филиппины
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В последнее время, два видео выданных Джамаа аль-Таухид валь-Джихад, группа филиппинских была размещена в Джихад аль-Shumukh форуме. В первом видео, которое длится три минуты, человек, одетый в лицо покрытия и называл себя Абу-Джихад аль-Luzuni, обвинил Америку в оккупационных Филиппины, осуществляющих пытки и убийства мусульман. Он продолжал присягнуть на верность лидеру Аль-Каиды Айман аз-Шейх-Завахири и других групп, филиал Аль-Каиды.
Во второй записи, Абу Абдалла аль-Фарис Аль-Mulatham обратился к моджахедам во всем мире, чтобы оперативно оказывать помощь братьев-мусульман на Филиппинах, в которой он утверждал, что был убит и ограблен захватчика Америке и помогать моджахедам там с деньгами , армирование, знаний и подготовки.
Абу-Абдалла также присягнул на верность лидеры джихада во всем мире, в первую очередь с лидером Исламского Эмирата Афганистан мулла Мухаммад Омар, лидер Аль-Каиды Айман аз-Шейх-Завахири. Это видео длится около 11 минут, производится Аль-Ярмук СМИ.
Ниже приведены основные моменты и видео. Видео было выпущено до приезда госсекретаря США Хиллари Клинтон на Филиппины с официальным визитом, который продолжался в течение нескольких дней:
Абу-Джихад аль-Luzini в видеообращении, размещенном 7 ноября заявил, что нет никакого способа восстановить исламский халифат и освободить родину от kafireen за исключением пути джихада и мечи, которые оформлены в Аллаха.
Чтение трудов на арабском языке на листе бумаги в руке, Абу Джихада попросил всех мусульман, где бы они ни были, чтобы слова Аллаха Всевышнего, пока правда и справедливость нескрываемым, и он сказал, что единственным способом достижения этого является путем внедрения шариата Аллаха. Он подчеркнул, что мусульманская умма в настоящее время в состоянии унижения, под контролем врагов Ислама и мусульман, должны работать вместе, чтобы спасти умму от деградации и угнетения.
Выступая от имени моджахедов Филиппины, Аль-Luzuni сказал: "Мы, молодежь уммы, из различных племен острова Филиппин, озабочены тем, чтобы ответить на этот божественный вызов ... в рамках удалить горя и гнева со стороны сердца людей, кто имеет веру (т.е. мусульман), и защищать честь нашей угнетенных братьев и сестер, погибших и тех, кто были изгнаны из своих домов и земли, которые были украдены ... Мы призываем Вас помочь нам и подготовить нас с пути джихада ради Аллаха ... потому что нет никакого способа восстановить исламский халифат и славу ислама, для отражения врагов ислама, а также освобождение нашей родины от накипи других кафиров, кроме путем Джихад и обнаженные мечи ради Аллаха ".
В то время как Абу Абдулла начал видеозапись, подчеркнув, что Филиппины были исламские земли от древности, и что, хотя он был завоеван различными захватчиками на протяжении всей истории, мусульмане никогда не сдался им. Он обвинил Америку - у которого есть "оккупированных" Филиппинах более 100 лет - в пытках и убийствах мусульман и захватить их земли, вплоть до превращения мусульман стали беднейшие слои населения (на Филиппинах). Он обратился к исламской умме, чтобы не сидеть сложа руки, но, чтобы подняться и защитить свою религию, свою жизнь, свою честь, и их свойства.
Абу Абдалла затем присягнул на верность всех лидеров мирового джихада, говоря: "Мы заявляем о своей лояльности к Аллаху, Его Расул, верующих и их имамов сегодня, такие как мулла Омар Шейх Айман аз-Завахири, Абу Бакр аль-Багдади аль-Кураиши и эмир AQAP, AQIM, моджахеды Аш-Шабааб в Сомали и других фронтах джихада ".
Он сказал, что исламская умма будет взять на себя этот мир из Америки, потеряв силы, как мировой сверхдержавы, о чем свидетельствует потери, которые они испытывают в Афганистане. Он также отметил, крах американской экономики и падения жестоким правителям арабских стран, добавив, что правители в Йемене и Сирии могут быть обречены, как Муаммар Каддафи.
Абу Абдалла заключение выступающий призвал моджахедов во всем мире, чтобы помочь своим братьям на Филиппинах. "Мы действительно нуждаемся в вас, чтобы отправить нам специалист по взрывчатым веществам и производство оружия, как наши братья в Ираке и Афганистане ... или дать нам Львов (т.е. моджахедов), чтобы предоставить нам тренировки в стрельбе и инша Аллах и мы, и вы получите место в грядущем мире ".
(Arrahmah.com)
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В последнее время, два видео выданных Джамаа аль-Таухид валь-Джихад, группа филиппинских была размещена в Джихад аль-Shumukh форуме. В первом видео, которое длится три минуты, человек, одетый в лицо покрытия и называл себя Абу-Джихад аль-Luzuni, обвинил Америку в оккупационных Филиппины, осуществляющих пытки и убийства мусульман. Он продолжал присягнуть на верность лидеру Аль-Каиды Айман аз-Шейх-Завахири и других групп, филиал Аль-Каиды.
Во второй записи, Абу Абдалла аль-Фарис Аль-Mulatham обратился к моджахедам во всем мире, чтобы оперативно оказывать помощь братьев-мусульман на Филиппинах, в которой он утверждал, что был убит и ограблен захватчика Америке и помогать моджахедам там с деньгами , армирование, знаний и подготовки.
Абу-Абдалла также присягнул на верность лидеры джихада во всем мире, в первую очередь с лидером Исламского Эмирата Афганистан мулла Мухаммад Омар, лидер Аль-Каиды Айман аз-Шейх-Завахири. Это видео длится около 11 минут, производится Аль-Ярмук СМИ.
Ниже приведены основные моменты и видео. Видео было выпущено до приезда госсекретаря США Хиллари Клинтон на Филиппины с официальным визитом, который продолжался в течение нескольких дней:
Абу-Джихад аль-Luzini в видеообращении, размещенном 7 ноября заявил, что нет никакого способа восстановить исламский халифат и освободить родину от kafireen за исключением пути джихада и мечи, которые оформлены в Аллаха.
Чтение трудов на арабском языке на листе бумаги в руке, Абу Джихада попросил всех мусульман, где бы они ни были, чтобы слова Аллаха Всевышнего, пока правда и справедливость нескрываемым, и он сказал, что единственным способом достижения этого является путем внедрения шариата Аллаха. Он подчеркнул, что мусульманская умма в настоящее время в состоянии унижения, под контролем врагов Ислама и мусульман, должны работать вместе, чтобы спасти умму от деградации и угнетения.
Выступая от имени моджахедов Филиппины, Аль-Luzuni сказал: "Мы, молодежь уммы, из различных племен острова Филиппин, озабочены тем, чтобы ответить на этот божественный вызов ... в рамках удалить горя и гнева со стороны сердца людей, кто имеет веру (т.е. мусульман), и защищать честь нашей угнетенных братьев и сестер, погибших и тех, кто были изгнаны из своих домов и земли, которые были украдены ... Мы призываем Вас помочь нам и подготовить нас с пути джихада ради Аллаха ... потому что нет никакого способа восстановить исламский халифат и славу ислама, для отражения врагов ислама, а также освобождение нашей родины от накипи других кафиров, кроме путем Джихад и обнаженные мечи ради Аллаха ".
В то время как Абу Абдулла начал видеозапись, подчеркнув, что Филиппины были исламские земли от древности, и что, хотя он был завоеван различными захватчиками на протяжении всей истории, мусульмане никогда не сдался им. Он обвинил Америку - у которого есть "оккупированных" Филиппинах более 100 лет - в пытках и убийствах мусульман и захватить их земли, вплоть до превращения мусульман стали беднейшие слои населения (на Филиппинах). Он обратился к исламской умме, чтобы не сидеть сложа руки, но, чтобы подняться и защитить свою религию, свою жизнь, свою честь, и их свойства.
Абу Абдалла затем присягнул на верность всех лидеров мирового джихада, говоря: "Мы заявляем о своей лояльности к Аллаху, Его Расул, верующих и их имамов сегодня, такие как мулла Омар Шейх Айман аз-Завахири, Абу Бакр аль-Багдади аль-Кураиши и эмир AQAP, AQIM, моджахеды Аш-Шабааб в Сомали и других фронтах джихада ".
Он сказал, что исламская умма будет взять на себя этот мир из Америки, потеряв силы, как мировой сверхдержавы, о чем свидетельствует потери, которые они испытывают в Афганистане. Он также отметил, крах американской экономики и падения жестоким правителям арабских стран, добавив, что правители в Йемене и Сирии могут быть обречены, как Муаммар Каддафи.
Абу Абдалла заключение выступающий призвал моджахедов во всем мире, чтобы помочь своим братьям на Филиппинах. "Мы действительно нуждаемся в вас, чтобы отправить нам специалист по взрывчатым веществам и производство оружия, как наши братья в Ираке и Афганистане ... или дать нам Львов (т.е. моджахедов), чтобы предоставить нам тренировки в стрельбе и инша Аллах и мы, и вы получите место в грядущем мире ".
(Arrahmah.com)
Attention Deficits after Traumatic Brain Injury
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) frequently produces impairments of attention in humans. These can result in a failure to maintain consistent goal-directed behavior. A predominantly right-lateralized frontoparietal network is often engaged during attentionally demanding tasks. However, lapses of attention have also been
associated with increases in activation within the default mode network (DMN).
Here, we study TBI patients with sustained attention impairment, defined on the basis of the consistency of their behavioral performance over time.Weshow that sustained attention impairments in patients are associated with an increase inDMNactivation, particularly within the precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex. Furthermore, the interaction of the precuneus with the rest of theDMNat the start of the task, i.e., its functional connectivity, predicts which patients go on to show impairments of attention. Importantly, this predictive information is present before any behavioral evidence of sustained attention impairment, and the relationship is also found in a subgroup of patients without focal brain damage.
TBI often results in diffuse axonal injury, which produces cognitive impairment by disconnecting nodes in distributed brain networks. Using diffusion tensor imaging, we demonstrate that structural disconnection within the DMN also correlates with the level of sustained attention. These results show that abnormalities inDMNfunction are a sensitive marker of impairments of attention and suggest that changes in connectivity within theDMNare central to the development of attentional impairment after TBI.
Functional connectivity analysis. For the functional connectivity analyses,
we used an independent component analysis (ICA)-based approach
(using multivariate exploratory linear decomposition into independent
components) (Beckmann and Smith, 2004) in combination with a “dual
regression technique” (Filippini et al., 2009; Zuo et al., 2010; Leech et al.,
2011). This involved an initial ICA decomposition of the data, followed
by further functional connectivity analysis of the output of the ICA. This
approach has a number of advantages over the use of seed voxel-based
approaches and has been used to probe behavioral and pathology-related
differences in multiple populations (Damoiseaux et al., 2008; Filippini et
al., 2009).
Temporal concatenation ICA was first used to define 25 reference
network maps common to task performance in patients and controls
(Beckmann et al., 2005). We then selected a single reference component
that captured the previously described DMN, and a set of anticorrelated
brain regions described previously as being part of both an executive
control network (including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and a salience
network (including the anterior cingulate and anterior insular
cortices) (Seeley et al., 2007). We refer to this network as the executive
control/salience network (EC/SN) (see Fig. 4A). To dissociate the respective
effect of DMN and EC/SN functional connectivity, this component
was split into its positive (DMN) and negative (EC/SN) parts.
These two subcomponents were further analyzed separately.
Preprocessed functional data from each individual were split into three equal parts, allowing the analysis of the initial and last thirds of the CRT separately.
Subsequent functional connectivity analysis was performed using the
dual regression approach (Filippini et al., 2009). This approach allows
the derivation of the individual independent component (IC) time
courses and spatial maps corresponding to the DMN and EC/SN.
Dual regression proceeds in three steps. In step 1, all unthresholded
group maps from the ICA output are linearly regressed against the first
and the last third of the preprocessed functional data from each individual
(spatial regression). This produces subject-specific time courses of
signal fluctuation corresponding to each group-level IC. In step 2, the
time courses are variance normalized and then linearly regressed against
the corresponding fMRI data (temporal regression), converting each
time series into subject-specific spatial maps of the corresponding component
(in this case the EC/SN and DMN). This method reliably produces
subject-specific approximations to the unthresholded spatial ICs
in the group ICA output (Zuo et al., 2010). In step 3, these individuallevel
dual-regression components were subsequently used to evaluate
individual functional connectivity. We extracted functional connectivity
from ROIs within the DMN and EC/SN separately for T1 and T3. Three
Figure 1. Overview of the methods used to analyze behavioral and brain changes during the performance of the CRT.
13444 • J. Neurosci., September 21, 2011 • 31(38):13442–13451 Bonnelle et al. • Sustained Attention Deficits and the Default Mode Network
ROIs were defined using the peaks of functional connectivity local maxima
from the DMN and EC/SN components. They corresponded to
the two major DMN nodes (MNI coordinates, precuneus, 6, 62, 28;
vmPFC, 2, 54, 8) and a region of the EC/SN where patients with
sustained attention impairment showed increased activation over time
[anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 2, 22, 40]. The measures derived
from this analysis index the strength of functional connectivity from each
region to the rest of its network during T1 and T3 separately. For instance,
the measure plotted on Figure 4B represents the functional connectivity
of the precuneus to the rest of the DMN during T1, controlling
for age. The average gray matter densities of the DMN and EC/SN were
extracted from individual gray matter density maps used previously as
confound regressors in the FEAT analysis. To control for individual variability
in gray matter density, these measures were regressed-out of the
functional connectivity analyses.
associated with increases in activation within the default mode network (DMN).
Here, we study TBI patients with sustained attention impairment, defined on the basis of the consistency of their behavioral performance over time.Weshow that sustained attention impairments in patients are associated with an increase inDMNactivation, particularly within the precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex. Furthermore, the interaction of the precuneus with the rest of theDMNat the start of the task, i.e., its functional connectivity, predicts which patients go on to show impairments of attention. Importantly, this predictive information is present before any behavioral evidence of sustained attention impairment, and the relationship is also found in a subgroup of patients without focal brain damage.
TBI often results in diffuse axonal injury, which produces cognitive impairment by disconnecting nodes in distributed brain networks. Using diffusion tensor imaging, we demonstrate that structural disconnection within the DMN also correlates with the level of sustained attention. These results show that abnormalities inDMNfunction are a sensitive marker of impairments of attention and suggest that changes in connectivity within theDMNare central to the development of attentional impairment after TBI.
Functional connectivity analysis. For the functional connectivity analyses,
we used an independent component analysis (ICA)-based approach
(using multivariate exploratory linear decomposition into independent
components) (Beckmann and Smith, 2004) in combination with a “dual
regression technique” (Filippini et al., 2009; Zuo et al., 2010; Leech et al.,
2011). This involved an initial ICA decomposition of the data, followed
by further functional connectivity analysis of the output of the ICA. This
approach has a number of advantages over the use of seed voxel-based
approaches and has been used to probe behavioral and pathology-related
differences in multiple populations (Damoiseaux et al., 2008; Filippini et
al., 2009).
Temporal concatenation ICA was first used to define 25 reference
network maps common to task performance in patients and controls
(Beckmann et al., 2005). We then selected a single reference component
that captured the previously described DMN, and a set of anticorrelated
brain regions described previously as being part of both an executive
control network (including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and a salience
network (including the anterior cingulate and anterior insular
cortices) (Seeley et al., 2007). We refer to this network as the executive
control/salience network (EC/SN) (see Fig. 4A). To dissociate the respective
effect of DMN and EC/SN functional connectivity, this component
was split into its positive (DMN) and negative (EC/SN) parts.
These two subcomponents were further analyzed separately.
Preprocessed functional data from each individual were split into three equal parts, allowing the analysis of the initial and last thirds of the CRT separately.
Subsequent functional connectivity analysis was performed using the
dual regression approach (Filippini et al., 2009). This approach allows
the derivation of the individual independent component (IC) time
courses and spatial maps corresponding to the DMN and EC/SN.
Dual regression proceeds in three steps. In step 1, all unthresholded
group maps from the ICA output are linearly regressed against the first
and the last third of the preprocessed functional data from each individual
(spatial regression). This produces subject-specific time courses of
signal fluctuation corresponding to each group-level IC. In step 2, the
time courses are variance normalized and then linearly regressed against
the corresponding fMRI data (temporal regression), converting each
time series into subject-specific spatial maps of the corresponding component
(in this case the EC/SN and DMN). This method reliably produces
subject-specific approximations to the unthresholded spatial ICs
in the group ICA output (Zuo et al., 2010). In step 3, these individuallevel
dual-regression components were subsequently used to evaluate
individual functional connectivity. We extracted functional connectivity
from ROIs within the DMN and EC/SN separately for T1 and T3. Three
Figure 1. Overview of the methods used to analyze behavioral and brain changes during the performance of the CRT.
13444 • J. Neurosci., September 21, 2011 • 31(38):13442–13451 Bonnelle et al. • Sustained Attention Deficits and the Default Mode Network
ROIs were defined using the peaks of functional connectivity local maxima
from the DMN and EC/SN components. They corresponded to
the two major DMN nodes (MNI coordinates, precuneus, 6, 62, 28;
vmPFC, 2, 54, 8) and a region of the EC/SN where patients with
sustained attention impairment showed increased activation over time
[anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 2, 22, 40]. The measures derived
from this analysis index the strength of functional connectivity from each
region to the rest of its network during T1 and T3 separately. For instance,
the measure plotted on Figure 4B represents the functional connectivity
of the precuneus to the rest of the DMN during T1, controlling
for age. The average gray matter densities of the DMN and EC/SN were
extracted from individual gray matter density maps used previously as
confound regressors in the FEAT analysis. To control for individual variability
in gray matter density, these measures were regressed-out of the
functional connectivity analyses.
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